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Abstract  
The paper analyzes the impact of massive capital flows and possible 
sudden stops on current account reversals. The aim of this paper is to consider 
the relationship between sudden stops and current account reversals in the 
eurozone and to explain the possibility of a balance-of-payment crisis within 
a monetary union. 
Peripheral eurozone countries experienced significant private-capital 
inflows from the core countries, followed by unambiguously massive 
outflows. Due to this, peripheral countries ran sustained current account 
deficits while core countries ran surpluses. 
At the end we analyze the evolution of current-account balances in the non-
euro area EU countries and the peripheral euro-area countries, and we find out 
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that current account deficits could be maintained over a longer period of time 
in the peripheral euro-area countries. 
Key words: capital flows, sudden stops, current account reversals, euro 
zone  
1. Capital flows, sudden stops and current account 
reversals  
The liberalization of the capital account of the balance of payments was 
one of the main reasons of the increasing amount of capital flows that came 
into many emerging economies. In the last decades, the restrictions on these 
capital movements have been eliminated and the world has witnessed the 
creation of a liberalized environment. 
But through this history there were examples when free capital mobility 
produced macroeconomic instability and contributed to financial vulnerability 
in the emerging nations. In a world of high capital mobility “sudden stops” of 
capital inflows can be highly disruptive, because they tend to result in major 
current account reversals, and in costly adjustment processes. 
Sudden stops are an abrupt slowdown of private capital inflows into an 
economy, due to new information about the capability of a country to honour 
its financial obligations. It is usually very disruptive to an economy, since it 
forces an almost immediate reversal in the current account from an external 
deficit to a surplus one. Current account reversals are broadly defined as “a 
major reduction in the current account deficit that takes place within a year or 
two” (Edwards, 2004). 
We have to take into account that current account reversals are more likely 
to occur in countries with persistent deficit, low reserves and unfavourable 
terms of trade, than in the countries that receive high official transfers.  
Experience has shown that sudden stops of capital flows and current 
account reversals have been closely related.  
Net capital inflows are the counterpart of current account deficits. 
Excessive net inflows may be an indication that the economy is running an u
nsustainable current account deficit. In this context, “excessive” capital 
mobility can be highly disruptive and restricting the degree of capital mobility 
will reduce the probability of a sudden stop and a current account reversal. 
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But, throughout history there have been many sudden stops that have not 
been related to reversal episodes. This indicates that when facing a sudden 
stop, many countries have effectively used their international reserves to avoid 
an abrupt current account adjustment. At the same time, a number of countries 
have gone through major current account reversals without facing a sudden 
stop in inflows. Most countries in this group were not receiving large inflows 
to begin with, and had financed their large deficits by drawing down 
international reserves. 
2. Capital flows, sudden stops and current account 
reversals in EMU 
One of the principal goals of Europe’s common currency has always been 
to promote greater financial market integration among member countries. It 
was expected that the common currency would make it easier for investors of 
certain euro countries to find good investment opportunities in other euro 
countries, since they would no longer have to worry about fickle exchange 
rates. The euro had created a low-inflation, low-interest-rate environment 
conducive to sustainable growth. It had fostered trade integration and the 
integration of financial markets among the members of the euro area. 
Furthermore, the single currency was expected to make balance of 
payments irrelevant between the euro-area member states. It seems awkward 
to speak of balance-of-payments crises within a monetary union that was 
designed to make such crises impossible. 
According to Ingram (1973), in a monetary union “payments imbalances 
among member nations can be financed in the short run through the financial 
markets, without need for interventions by a monetary authority. It was 
believed that a major effect of EMU is that balance-of-payments constraints 
will disappear. Private markets will finance all viable borrowers, and savings 
and investment balances will no longer be constraints at the national level”. 
At the time of the inception of the euro-area, a prevailing view was that 
current-account imbalances among participating countries should not be a 
major concern in a monetary union. Among euro-area countries, balance-of-
payments would become as irrelevant as among regions within a country. 
Soon after the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union significant 
amounts of capital started to flow from what are today called the core countries 
to the periphery of the euro-area. Countries like Greece, Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy seemed to offer attractive investment opportunities relative 
to the economies of the core (Germany, France, Austria) and there was no 
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longer risk associated with the exchange rate.  Also, there was widespread 
optimism concerning the expectation of rapid income growth resulting from 
joining the euro. The elimination of the exchange rate risk appeared beneficial 
for both borrowers and lenders. Everything was being seen as a part of a well-
functioning monetary union, which was designed to make a balance of 
payment crisis impossible. 
Capital flew from countries with abundant capital, and thus relatively low 
returns on investments, to countries that were relatively capital-poor, and that 
therefore offered high returns on investments. Core eurozone countries, like 
Germany, France, Austria, took advantage of relatively high rates of return in 
the periphery, see table 1. 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Greece 4.26 3.59 4.07 4.5 4.8 5.17 9.09 15.75 22.5 10.05 
Italy 4.26 3.55 4.05 4.49 4.68 4.31 4.04 5.42 5.49 4.32 
Spain 4.10 3.39 3.78 4.31 4.36 3.97 4.25 5.44 5.85 4.56 
Germany 4.04 3.35 3.76 4.22 3.98 3.22 2.74 2.61 1.5 1.57 
France 4.1 3.41 3.8 4.3 4.23 3.64 3.12 3.32 2.54 2.2 
Austria 4.13 3.4 3.8 4.3 4.36 3.94 3.22 3.32 2.37 2.01 
Table 1. Long-term European interest rates, Total, % per annum (2004-2013) 
Source: OECD database. 
 
But, as we can see from Table 1, in the years after the crisis, interest rates 
in the peripheral countries continue to rise more rapidly than in core countries. 
The most evident case is in Greece, where interest rates reached a record level 
of 22.5% in 2012. Due to this, peripheral countries encountered difficulties to 
finance their budget deficits via financial markets. This increased the 
probability of a sovereign default or even an exit from the euro-area. 
The capital flows into a country are measured by its current account 
deficit—a negative current account deficit means that the country is the 
recipient of international lending, while a surplus indicates that capital is being 
invested abroad. Many of the Southern European members ran sustained 
current account deficits while the Northern members ran surpluses (see chart 
1). A basic assumption in the economy is that if a country is running a current 
account deficit, this is “balanced up” or “financed” by seeking to run a capital 
account deficit. From this point, core countries experience a deficit in capital 
account, while peripheral countries surplus (see chart 2).  
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 5/16/17 1:09 PM
 29 
 
 
Chart 1. 
Source: OECD database. 
 
 
Chart 2. 
Source: OECD database. 
Although the country’s large current-account deficits signalled a 
competitiveness problem, capital continued to flow into the peripheral 
countries until 2008-2009, pushing up money and credit growth which, in turn, 
increased the inflation. Macroeconomic imbalances occurred in the form of 
large and persistent current account deficits, which had increased the 
accumulation of external debt and deteriorated the competitiveness of these 
countries compared to the core countries.  
But, with the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, despite the 
solid economic fundamentals in emerging market economies, the lack of 
liquidity made international banks and investors withdraw portfolio 
investments from these economies. The sudden stop which happened in 2009 
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made it difficult for these countries to roll over debt, and thus caused a crisis. 
(Svrtinov at al, 2014). 
3. Current account reversal in periphery euro-area 
and non euro-area EU countries 
The table below reports the evolution of current-account balances in the 
non euro-area EU countries and the peripheral euro-area countries. It is 
apparent that the two groups of countries have not followed the same path: 
whereas adjustment has been brutal for the first group, with deficits amounting 
to 12 to 22 percent of GDP transformed into surpluses over one, two or three 
years, it has been more slow for the second group of countries. This means 
that current-account adjustments after the crisis have been slower in euro-area 
countries than in non-euro-area EU countries, which undergo a profound 
adjustment process to correct their external position, mainly by reducing 
private and public expenditure. The financing channel available through the 
Eurosystem protected the banking systems of the countries in the euro-area 
from the immediate effects of a sudden stop in private capital flows. 
Substantial current account deficits could thus be maintained over a longer 
period of time in the peripheral euro-area countries (Ferry and Merler, 2012). 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Spain -8.8 -9.8 -9.5 -4.7 -4.4 -3.6 -1.2 1.4 0.8 
Greece -10.8 -14 -14.5 -10.9 -10.1 -9.9 -2.5 0.6 0.9 
Italy -2.5 -2.3 -2.8 -1.9 -3.5 -3.1 -0.4 0.9 1.9 
Portugal -10.7 -9.8 -12.2 -10.4 -10.2 -6.1 -2.1 1.4 0.6 
Latvia1 -20.9 -20.8 -12.6 8.2 2.4 -2.8 -3.2 -2.3 -3.1 
Lithuania2 -10.4 -14.6 -13.4 2.3 -0.3 -3.8 -1.2 1.6 0.1 
Bulgaria -17.4 -26.2 -22.3 -8.5 -1.6 0.2 -0.9 1.8 0.9 
Table 2. Current account balance (% of GDP) in EMU and non euro-area countries 
Source: World Bank database. 
The injection of liquidity has helped to accommodate persistent current-
account adjustments in the southern part of the euro-area, but what is most 
important, it has protected countries that could no longer rely on adjusting 
their exchange rates from the full negative impact of a sudden stop. We have 
to take into account that in EMU, countries cannot carry out currency 
devaluation because they have the euro and they give up the opportunity to 
                                                          
1 In that period Latvia was not part of EMU 
2 In that period Lithuania was not part of EMU 
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select a monetary policy that is regarded as optimal for their own 
circumstances. 
The observed private capital outflows have been counteracted by equally 
sizable public capital inflows, which have taken three forms in the euro-area: 
EU/IMF assistance programs; provision by the Eurosystem of liquidity to the 
banking sector; and ECB purchases of sovereign bonds under the Securities 
Market programme. 
Substitution of private capital inflows by public ones, especially 
Eurosystem financing, has provided a buffer against the drying up of private 
liquidity and to some extent has helped to accommodate persistent current-
account deficits. 
But, due to massive bailouts, which have run into the hundreds of billions 
of euros, as well as high interest rates, peripheral EMU countries have faced 
debt crises. The maximum debt allowed by the European Union is 60 percent 
of gross domestic product. None of the countries in the table 3 have met this 
standard. Even in the core countries, government debt as a percent of GDP 
was higher than 60 percent. In peripheral countries, government debt was 
more than 100 percent of GDP. 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Germany 67.7 70.3 68.4 64.3 68.1 75.6 84.1 83.5 86.4 81.6 82.2 
France 80 81.7 76.9 75.6 81.5 93.2 96.8 100.7 110.6 110.4  
Austria 71.3 75.8 72.4 68.7 74 79.9 85.2 86.9 91.8 89.2 98.1 
Greece 107.6 111.4 115.8 113.1 117.4 134.8 128.3 110.3 164.4 179.7 178.2 
Italy 114.6 117.4 115 110.6 112.9 125.9 124.8 117.8 136 143.2 156.2 
Spain 52.5 50 45.7 41.7 47.1 61.7 66.5 77.2 91 102 115.5 
Table 3. General government debt, total, as a % of GDP 
Source: OECD database. 
 
Moreover, efforts to reduce governmental deficits by i.e. higher taxes 
and/or lower expenses faced strong social resistance in the weak countries. 
Meanwhile, euro-area leaders and the ECB also installed some supra-national 
arrangements to prevent contagion and endangerment of the euro itself. 
But, the relationship between budget deficit and crisis is weaker. The factor 
that crisis countries have in common is that, without exception, they ran the 
largest current account deficits in the euro zone during the period 2000-2007. 
The relationship between budget deficits and crisis is much weaker; some of 
the crisis countries had significant average surpluses during the years leading 
up to the crisis, while some of the euro zone countries with large fiscal deficits 
did not experience crisis. 
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4. Summary 
Sudden stops of capital inflows are defined as a situation where the flow of 
capital coming into a country is reduced significantly in a very short period of 
time and current account reversals are major reductions in the current account 
deficit that take place within a year or two. Experience has shown that sudden 
stops of capital flows and current account reversals have been closely related. 
Current account reversals are more likely to occur in countries with 
persistent deficit, low reserves and unfavourable terms of trade, than in the 
countries that receive high official transfers.  
Euro adoption encouraged a capital flow bonanza from the countries which 
constitute the centre of the Eurozone, to the countries which make up the 
periphery of the Eurozone, where it was possible to obtain better returns, due 
to their less developed financial systems. This explains the large current 
account surplus in the euro core countries and the deficits in the euro 
peripheral countries. The current account positions of some of the euro-area’s 
peripheral members have fallen. Large and persistent current account deficits 
contributed to a large accumulation of external debt and were accompanied by 
a generalized deterioration of the competitiveness relative to other euro area-
core countries. On the other side, core countries experience deficit in capital 
accounts, while peripheral countries experience surplus. 
But, with the beginning of the crisis, the financial institutions from the core 
countries stricken by the crisis started to withdraw capital massively from their 
affiliates located in the peripheral countries, which caused a negative influence 
over foreign exchange reserves and even over the liquidity crises in these 
economies. 
The current account deficit in the peripheral EMU countries has adjusted 
only partially, given the important role of euro system financing. When 
compared to other countries outside the monetary union, the adjustment when 
facing a sudden stop was much faster and sharper, i.e. the adjustment was 
quicker outside EMU than inside it. Substantial current account deficits could 
thus be maintained over a longer period of time in the peripheral euro-area 
countries. 
Given the level of integration of euro-area financial markets, the effects of 
unmitigated sudden stops in Southern Europe would have endangered the 
entire system and put at risk the survival of the single currency. 
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